Global displacement, and its asymmetry
Continental and structural trendsAt the end of 2025, UNHCR estimated the total forcibly displaced population worldwide at 117.8 million, a marginal contraction from the mid-2024 peak of roughly 122 million. Several analyses caution that this nominal decline reflected large-scale, often involuntary returns to precarious environments rather than the resolution of active conflict or the easing of persecution.
Of the global total, an estimated 35.6 million are refugees under UNHCR's mandate (about 27 million under its direct mandate, 1.5 million in refugee-like situations, and 7.2 million otherwise in need of international protection). A further 9 million are asylum-seekers awaiting decisions, 6 million are Palestine refugees under UNRWA's mandate, and 68.7 million remain internally displaced within their own countries. That is roughly one in every seventy people on Earth living away from home by force.
The distribution remains highly uneven. Low- and middle-income nations host an estimated 68–71% of the world's refugees, and roughly 65% of refugees reside in countries neighbouring their own, a reminder that the primary responsibility for hosting continues to fall on developing regions rather than wealthier states.
| Region | Displaced (m) | Share | Major hosts |
|---|---|---|---|
| The Americas | 22.8 | 19.4% | Colombia, Peru, United States |
| Eastern & Southern Africa | 22.7 | 19.3% | Uganda, Ethiopia, Kenya |
| Middle East & North Africa | 21.8 | 18.5% | Türkiye, Jordan, Egypt |
| Europe | 18.1 | 15.4% | Germany, Poland, Czechia |
| West & Central Africa | 16.4 | 13.9% | Chad, Cameroon, Niger |
| Asia & the Pacific | 16.0 | 13.5% | Iran, Pakistan, Bangladesh |
Source: UNHCR Global Trends and Mid-Year Trends, 2025.
The funding contraction, and its operational cost
The "aid cliff"The humanitarian architecture entered an acute operational crisis in 2025–2026 amid a sharp contraction in donor funding that analysts have described as an "aid cliff." The wind-down of the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and reductions by other major donors, including a reported 76% cut to Germany's humanitarian budget between 2022 and 2025, contributed to a fall in UNHCR's 2025 funding to roughly $3.5 billion, about 28% lower year-on-year. UNHCR set its 2026 budget at $8.505 billion, a 20% reduction, accompanied by reported staffing cuts of 25–33% and the downsizing or closure of 185 of some 550 field offices.
With fewer resources, agencies have shifted from broad-based support toward what they describe as "hyperprioritization", a triage focused on immediate survival that, by some estimates, reaches only about 38% of those assessed as in need. Analysts note a parallel trend in which aid is increasingly tied to migration management: targeted assistance to host states in the Global South, coupled with "route-based approaches" that combine protection with border measures and assisted returns along migration corridors.
| Metric | 2024 | 2025 / 2026 | Reported impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| UNHCR budget requirement | $10.604 b (2025) | $8.505 b (2026) | −20% contraction |
| USAID global expenditure | $8.0 b | $5.8 b | ~92% of grants terminated |
| US migration & refugee assistance | $4.6 b | $3.2 b | Obligations fell toward $2.9 b |
| German humanitarian spending | Baseline | −76% by 2025 | Deep contraction |
| UNHCR workforce | Full staffing | −25% to −33% | ~5,200 posts reported cut |
Sources: UNHCR; American University / Baker Institute analysis; agency reporting, 2025–2026.
Ten situations that define the moment
Concentrated, protracted, and precariousThe global picture is concentrated in a small number of protracted crises, each shaped by a particular intersection of conflict, climate shock, and political change. The summaries below draw on reported figures; several remain fast-moving.
Venezuela and the South American corridor
The outflow from Venezuela remains the largest displacement situation in the Western Hemisphere, at roughly 7.9 million refugees and migrants worldwide, about 6.7 million within Latin America and the Caribbean, led by Colombia (an estimated 2.8 million) and Peru (1.6 million). Colombia's Temporary Protection Status (ETPV) granted ten-year residency to nearly two million people, though the closure of the application window has left later arrivals in legal limbo. In Peru, observers report a hardening of policy toward Venezuelan migrants. Regionally, an estimated 2.3 million remain undocumented, and irregular crossings of the Darién Gap fell 36% from 2023 to about 210,000. Following a change of government in Venezuela in early 2026, forecasts diverge sharply: a stable transition could enable the return of 1.2–2 million people, while prolonged instability could instead renew outward migration.
Ukraine and the European framework
By late 2025 there were an estimated 5.7 million Ukrainian refugees registered abroad and 3.7 million people internally displaced, many having moved more than once. Around 4.37 million are hosted across the EU under the Temporary Protection Directive, with Germany the largest host (nearly 1.2 million). The EU has repeatedly extended the directive, with 2026 proposals reaching toward March 2028, even as several states move from emergency relief to transition planning, national residency pathways, adjusted benefits, and return-assistance aligned with reconstruction. Inside Ukraine, the humanitarian cost remains severe: the RDNA4 assessment (February 2025) put direct damages at roughly $176 billion as of December 2024, and civilian casualties rose in 2025.
Syria and post-2024 returns
The fall of the previous government in December 2024 reshaped Syrian displacement. In the following period, more than three million Syrians, refugees from neighbouring countries and internally displaced people, returned toward their places of origin, reducing the global Syrian refugee population to an estimated 4.9 million by end-2025. Conditions of return remain difficult: an estimated 76.6% of the country's housing stock is reported damaged or destroyed, services are limited, and surveys suggest a majority view their returns as exploratory or temporary.
| Province | Returnees (est.) | Principal constraints |
|---|---|---|
| Damascus City | 286,000 | Administrative backlog; rental inflation |
| Idlib | 239,000 | Unexploded ordnance; flood damage |
| Aleppo | 233,000 | Damaged urban grid and water systems |
| Rif Dimashq | 212,000 | Limited healthcare; school closures |
| Homs | 206,000 | Construction costs; agricultural loss |
| Hama | 166,000 | Weak power grid and municipal capacity |
Source: UNHCR return monitoring, 2025.
Afghanistan and regional returns
Afghanistan remains among the most severe situations, with an estimated 3.7 million refugees abroad and 9.1 million internally displaced at end-2025. A defining dynamic has been large-scale returns from Pakistan and Iran under tightened residency policies; Pakistan alone reported the return of more than one million Afghans in 2025, with further measures reported in 2026. Returns are occurring into an economy with limited capacity to absorb them, and the situation is especially acute for women and girls, who face severe restrictions on education and work. In 2026, Germany indicated it would resume returns of some Afghan nationals, a policy that human-rights organizations have contested.
Sudan and the crisis in the region
Since April 2023, Sudan has become one of the world's largest displacement crises. By mid-2026, the conflict had displaced an estimated twelve million people, around 9.1 million internally and more than 2.8 million as refugees in neighbouring states. The response faces a reported funding gap of about 72%, and access constraints, including the reported closure of the Adré crossing in early 2026, have complicated aid delivery to Darfur amid grave food-security warnings.
| Destination | Registered refugees | Key deficits |
|---|---|---|
| Egypt | 1.4 m | Per-capita monthly aid reported down from $11 to $4 |
| Eastern Chad | 918,000+ | Tens of thousands without shelter; water below standard |
| Uganda | 91,000 | Suspension of some nutrition programs |
| Central African Republic | 40,000 | Fragile state capacity; peacekeeping cuts |
Source: Sudan Regional Refugee Response Plan; UNHCR, 2026.
Palestinian refugees and the crisis in Gaza
By mid-2026, an estimated two million Palestinians remained displaced in Gaza. Reported figures indicate large-scale casualties and that a substantial majority of housing units have been destroyed. A ceasefire took effect in October 2025, though conditions have improved little. UNRWA, the principal provider of health, education, and water services, faces an acute funding and mandate crisis: the United States formally ended its support (reported at $422 million) in 2025, and the agency's budget was reduced from $1.48 billion to $830 million, even as reporting indicates nearly 400 UNRWA staff were killed during the conflict. On the diplomatic track, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 2803 in November 2025, endorsing a transitional plan that some Palestinian factions have rejected. In Lebanon, a late-2025 statistical revision put the resident Palestine-refugee figure at roughly 228,300, well below the previously registered total.
South Sudan
South Sudan is a multidirectional crisis, a source of refugees, a place of internal displacement, and a destination for people fleeing Sudan. The refugee population stood at an estimated 2.4 million by late 2025, with a further 326,000 newly displaced internally. Recurrent flooding has damaged farmland and cut supply routes, and a cholera outbreak linked to the wider regional epidemic has spread through crowded sites, with women and children most exposed.
Rohingya and the Bangladesh camps
The Rohingya remain the world's largest stateless population, at roughly 1.8 million, about 1.2 million hosted in dense, hazard-prone camps in Cox's Bazar and Bhasan Char in Bangladesh. Renewed violence in Myanmar has driven further arrivals since 2024, while the 2026 Joint Response Plan was reduced 26% to $710.5 million, forcing cuts to protection, health, and education. In July 2026, monsoon landslides and flooding destroyed hundreds of shelters and killed at least 14 people. A 2025 UN oversight review also flagged financial mismanagement and unused infrastructure. The absence of formal education and local livelihoods has driven perilous maritime journeys, with hundreds reported dead or missing in 2025.
Democratic Republic of the Congo
The DRC remains a deeply entrenched emergency, with an estimated 8.2 million forcibly displaced, including around 5.8 million displaced internally and more than 1.2 million Congolese refugees in neighbouring countries. Conflict in the eastern provinces expanded in 2025, and logistics have been constrained by bank closures and the shutdown of Goma airport. Food insecurity is extreme, with tens of millions in crisis or emergency phases and high rates of acute malnutrition. Regional initiatives, including a June 2025 peace agreement outlining voluntary returns, offer some hope, but the security landscape remains volatile, with spillover into neighbouring states.
Somalia and the Horn of Africa
Somalis constitute more than half of the registered refugee population in Kenya, which hosts over 854,800 refugees, concentrated in the Dadaab and Kakuma complexes; Dadaab alone hosts more than 409,000 people, many of them third-generation refugees. Encampment policies limit movement and formal work, deepening dependence on assistance, assistance the funding contraction has sharply curtailed, with reported ration cuts to 40% of standard provisions and rising child-malnutrition risk. Severe climate shocks, from prolonged drought to destructive flooding, have compounded the crisis.
Strategic implications
Climate, integration, and exit pathsClimate change acts as a risk multiplier, particularly in fragile regions where drought and flooding erode livelihoods and sharpen resource competition. The evidence indicates that most climate-related displacement is internal rather than international, often involving repeated moves within a country, a pattern that argues for localized adaptation frameworks alongside international response.
In response to the protracted nature of modern displacement, several host states in the Global South are shifting from perpetual-aid models toward longer-term integration. Kenya's "Shirika Plan", aligned with the Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework, seeks to transition long-standing camps into integrated, self-reliant settlements. Yet integration cannot succeed as a cost-saving measure for donors: where funding has fallen, ration cuts have imposed real costs on host communities and fuelled political backlash, underscoring that durable inclusion requires sustained development investment.
At the other end, several high-income states are preparing coordinated exits from emergency protection frameworks, moving eligible refugees onto national permits while facilitating voluntary returns. Poorly coordinated, these transitions risk a fragmented legal landscape and heightened vulnerability for those least able to adapt.
Conclusion
The dynamics of 2025–2026 suggest a humanitarian system under structural strain. The headline reduction in displacement reflects funding contraction, host-state pressure, and returns to precarious conditions more than any durable peace. A model that relies on a small number of donors to fund the containment of most of the world's refugees within lower-income host states is reaching its limits.
A more resilient response would move from short-term, volatile aid toward multi-year development and peacebuilding investment that addresses root causes and supports host communities; broaden responsibility-sharing through expanded legal pathways and resettlement; and provide predictable, non-politicized funding to agencies such as UNHCR and UNRWA.
For the shelter response specifically, these dynamics sharpen a practical question: what does dignified, durable shelter look like when displacement lasts years, spans every climate, and unfolds under shrinking budgets? That is the question Estia Homes was designed to answer.